Florida Law Review
Volume 21

Issue 2

Article 11

September 1968

Constitutional Law: The "No Evidence" Doctrine Revived--New
Directions for Due Process Adjudication by the United States
Supreme Court?
William Knight Zewadski

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William Knight Zewadski, Constitutional Law: The "No Evidence" Doctrine Revived--New Directions for Due
Process Adjudication by the United States Supreme Court?, 21 Fla. L. Rev. 277 (1968).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss2/11

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Zewadski: Constitutional Law: The "No Evidence" Doctrine Revived--New Direc

1968]

CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE "NO EVIDENCE" DOCTRINE
REVIVED-NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DUE PROCESS
ADJUDICATION BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT?
Johnson v.Florida,88 S.Ct. 1713 (1968)
Defendant, having been convicted under Florida's vagrancy statute, and
having had that conviction affirmed by the Florida supreme court, 2 appealed,

asserting that the vagrancy statute was void for vagueness. The United States
Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, granted motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, reversed and HELD, that there was no evidence to show that
eighteen-year-old defendant, discovered by police sitting on a bench at a bus
stop at 4:25 a.m., was guilty of "wandering or strolling around from place
to place without any lawful purpose or object."' Judgment reversed, Justices
Black and Stewart would dismiss the appeal, Justices White and Harlan dis-

senting from the Court's opinion but would note probable jurisdiction on
defendant's void for vagueness claim.
Simply stated, the "no evidence" doctrine is that a violation of procedural
due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments occurs if a state
convicts where absolutely no evidence has been shown for one or more
essential elements of a crime. In the present case, for example, no evidence
of "wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object" as charged was shown when defendant was found sitting
on a bus stop bench early in the morning and was unable to explain to the
satisfaction of police why he was there. In the first "no evidence" case,
Thompson v. Louisville,4 as in the instant case, defendant asserted that he
was waiting for a bus and was arrested for loitering. In both cases the fact
of previous arrests (fifty-four for Thompson; Johnson was on probation for
breaking and entering) may have influenced the conviction and may have
substituted for proof of the necessary elements of the crime charged.
In the present case the United States Supreme Court revives the "no
evidence" doctrine first enunciated as a constitutional requirement of due
F] .STAT. §856.02 (1967).
2. Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1967) (per curiam) (Ervin, J., dissenting in
part, regarding only the application of the vagrancy statute and not the statute itself as
being unconstitutional).
3. FLA. STAT. §856.02 (1967). The present case is the first to attack the Florida statute
as being void for vagueness, although municipal vagrancy ordinances have been held invalid.
Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1965). The Florida supreme court was unanimous
in its finding that the Florida statute was constitutional Such statutes, however, have been
widely criticized. See, e.g., Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted); Edelman v. California,
344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953) (Black, Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on
Suspicion, 20 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104
U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956); Lacy, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66
HARv. L. Rxv. 1203, 1207 (1953) (noting that Florida's statute with its twenty categories is
among the most complex).
4. 862 U.S. 199 (1960).
1.
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process in Thompson v. Louisvilles in 1960. The rule was applied in seven
reversals in the subsequent six years. 6 Then the Court moved away from a
clear holding of the doctrine in Brown v. Louisiana7 found other grounds
for reversal in five cases where the doctrine was invoked,8 and refused to
reverse on the asserted basis of "no evidence" in two others. 9 Until the
present case, it appeared that the doctrine had been abandoned in Adderley v.
Florida," late in 1966. Three times since Adderley the argument has been
5. 362 U.S. 199 (1960), 80 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1961); see Note, Constitutional Law-Due
Process- Conviction Without Evidence of Guilt, 59 MICH. L. Rav. 306 (1960). Earlier the
Court had touched on the doctrine. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Creswill v. Grand
Lodge Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912). State courts had developed the doctrine
only in Mauldin v. State, 28 Ala. App. 30, 177 So. 309 (1937), where after a charge of
larceny had been nol-prossed, a conviction of embezzling eleven hogs was held to lack any
evidence of an agency relationship, which is a necessary element of the crime.
6. The first and chief reversal based on Thompson's "no evidence" doctrine is Garner
v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (breach of peace conviction reversed where Negroes had
sat peacefully at segregated lunch counter). Other reversals were, in chronological order:
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962) (per curiam) (breach of peace conviction reversed
where Negro defendants merely waited peacefully in bus station waiting room); George
v. Clemmons, 373 U.S. 241 (1963) (mem.) (contempt order reversed where based on
supposed fact that mere presence of Negroes in courtroom had tendency to disrupt
court proceedings); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (reversal partly based on lack
of any evidence to show breach of peace by Negroes peacefully playing basketball in
segregated park); Fields v. City of Fairfield, 375 U. S. 248 (1963) (mem.) (contempt order
reversed because no evidence was shown that injunction prohibiting meeting at specific location had been violated when defendants held meeting across the street from prohibited location); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964) (breach of peace conviction overturned
when no evidence was shown that Negro defendants' conduct at lunch counter was disorderly); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 94 (1965) (second case) (conviction of
Negro for disobeying lawful order of traffic officer reversed because no evidence was present
that officer had been directing traffic; Douglas, J., concurring, would add that a second
conviction of obstructing sidewalk should be reversed, not on the void for vagueness
finding of the majority, but because one person standing alone cannot block a walk). See
Note, No Evidence To Support a Conviction - The Supreme Court's Decision in Thompson
v. Louisville and Garner v. Louisiana, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1137 (1962).
7. 383 U.S. 131 (1966). In the 3-1-1-4 decision, Justices Fortas, Warren, and Douglas
reversed in part because no evidence had been shown that breach of peace occurred when
Negroes held peaceful sit-in in library.
8. A ground for a "no evidence" decision was present in five cases, but the Court
applied a more far-reaching doctrine in reversing: Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235 (1963) (freedom of speech, assembly, and petition); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
373 U.S. 262 (1963) (first case) (one cannot aid and abet an act held innocent in a companion decision); Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964) (equal protection applies in
courtrooms) (Black, J., concurring would find inter alia no evidence of contempt where
Negro witness refused to answer questions addressed to her as "Mary" rather than as
"Miss Hamilton"); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (improper retroactive
judicial interpretation applied); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965) (first case)
(statute overbroad).
9. The Court found "some" evidence present in the second case of Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 566 (1965), but found other grounds for reversal. In Drews v. Maryland, 381 U.S.
421, 423 (1965) (per curiam dismissal of appeal and denial of certiorari), Justices Warren
and Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari saying no evidence was present to support Negro defendants' conviction of disorderly conduct.
10. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). From the second Shuttlesworth opinion, 382 U.S. 87 (1965),
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raised and the Court has instead found some evidence directly or implicitly."
Two principles underlie the "no evidence" doctrine: the presumption of
innocence of the accused, and the necessity that the state must bear the
burden of proof in criminal trials. Further, it embodies several aspects of
due process -the fundamental fairness test and protection from arbitrary
state action. The rule does not judge the quality of evidence (such as perjured testimony, suppressed evidence, illegal search and seizure) nor the
sufficiency of evidence, but only the question of whether any evidence at all
was presented. Analytically, this may mean (1) that no evidence was
adduced except the charge itself, (2) that no reasonable inference can be
drawn as to defendant's guilt from the evidence presented, or (3) that acts
A and B do not constitute the crime of C. This last meaning is evident in
the present case where "sitting" did not constitute the crime of wandering or
strolling without lawful purpose. As the majority noted, "The bench where
he sat was made for sitting and he was using it for that purpose in the
precise place where the bench had been placed."'1 2 In the decision the United
States Supreme Court acted as a higher court of review of a state finding and
13
characterization of fact.
The "no evidence" doctrine must be considered in light of its usefulness
handed down Nov. 15, 1965, until the present case, June 3, 1968, no Supreme Court majority used the "no evidence" doctrine as a basis for reversal.
11. Cameron v. Johnson, 88 S. Ct. 1335, 1343 (1968) (Fortas, Douglas, JJ., dissenting)
(in Cameron the dissenting justices find "no evidence" that the state of Mississippi was
motivated by a bona fide belief that courthouse doorways were obstructed and finds an improper state purpose was to stop a constitutionally protected, peaceful demonstration. Id.
at 1343-44, citing Thompson). Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 312 n.4 (1967)
(sufficient circumstantial evidence present in record); Temple v. United States, 386 U.S.
961, 962 (1967) (Black, Douglas, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
12. 88 S.Ct. at 1715 (1968).
13. In the initial cases under the doctrine the Court did not have to overturn the
factfinding of the highest state court. In Thompson no appeal was possible from the police
court, and in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), the state supreme court denied
writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. In recent years the federal courts have
greatly expanded the possibility of an independent evidentiary hearing or review of a state
finding of fact, particularly where constitutional issues are raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293 (1963);
Brennan, State Supreme Court Judge Versus United States Supreme Court Justice: A Change
in Function and Perspective, 19 U. FIA. L. Rxv. 225, 233-36 (1966). In Florida the postconviction review by federal courts has been somewhat restricted by the adoption of "Rule
One," FLA. PL Cpum. P. 1.850; see Brown, Collateral Post Conviction Remedies in Florida,
20 U. FrA. L. REv. 306 (1968), but may be expanded in the preconviction area under the
anti-harassment provisions of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US. 479 (1965). But see Cameron v.
Johnson, 88 S. Ct. 1335 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting, criticizes the Cameron majority for
limiting Dombrowski so as not to apply when a valid statute is applied to discourage protected activities. Id. at 1341). It was partly the expansion of federal review over state
courts that gave rise to the recent attempt in the United States Senate to abolish federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction over state criminal convictions and also remove federal power
to review the validity of confessions used in state criminal trials. Title II, Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Bill, S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See 114 CONG. Rc.5998-99
(daily ed. May 21, 1968) (remarks of Senator Fong); 114 CONG. REc. 5830-47 (daily ed.
May 17, 1968). The attempt to restrict the federal courts' jurisdiction failed. 114 CONG. REc.
6037-39, 6043-45 (daily ed. May 21, 1968).
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as a tool of judicial decisionmaking. Professor Kadish has suggested that due
process adjudication can be either flexible or fixed. 14 If one accepts his
conclusion that the flexible approach is desirable, one finds that the doctrine
could have been better formulated to give it a broader and more fully
articulated application. A "fixed" standard is one having precise common
law and constitutional limitations. Accordingly, since the requirement of
"due process" is explicitly itemized in the fifth amendment, that term
15
cannot comprehend other mentioned rights of the first eight amendments.
A variant of this fixity principle is that the fourteenth amendment incorporated each and every right of the Bill of Rights to the states16 and only those
specifically enumerated rights are so incorporated. Since Mr. Justice Black,
a proponent of this "fixed" incorporation approach, spoke for the Court
in formulating the "no evidence" doctrine in Thompson, he must feel that
the principle is inherent in the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process.
In that decision, the strong emphasis that the Court will not pass on the
sufficiency of evidence but only on whether some evidence is present in the
record underlines the fixity of the doctrine 17 and points up the mechanistic
manner in which it was conceived to work.
Opposed to this fixed view is the "flexible" approach to due process
adjudication that sees "due process" as having no precise or fixed meaning
but rather as a fundamental principle adaptable to new conditions. Under
its dictates the judge does not decide cases by personal whim or predilection
but looks to precedent, the demands of fairness, and the "moral principles
so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history,"'s for guidance in determining the contours of due process. Such an
approach requires greater sensitivity to the underlying purposes of due
process in a novel application than a mechanistic method of fixed due process.
Mr. Justice Black has stated that he fears the flexible approach would permit
the Court "to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and
to trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain of the States as well as
the Federal Government."' 9 Professor Kadish, on the other hand, sees the
chief virtue of due process in its adaptability to changing societal attitudes
"incompatible with changeless meanings.' 20 Moreover, he criticizes the fixed
approach because it obscures the value choices lying beneath decisions made
according to its more rigid conceptions of due process. 1
14. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication, 66 YALE L.J. 319
(1957).
15. Id. at 324, See, e.g., Note, The Warren Court: A Study of Selected Civil Liberties,
20 U. FLA. L. Rav. 201, 223-28 (1967).
16. The most recent "incorporation" is the right of trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana,

88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968).
17. "Decision of the question turns not on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on
whether this conviction rests upon any evidence at all." Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960).
18. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14, 16 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
19. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 90 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
20. Kadish, supra note 14, at 340-41.
21. Id. at 344.
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Seen from this perspective, the "no evidence" doctrine would be more
flexible and hence both more useful and more articulate in revealing underlying value choices if it had been stated differently. A better formulation
would have been to have prohibited unreasonable or illogical interpretations
of state law contrary to the plain meaning of the language (where no prior
interpretations had reasonably modified its meaning) as violations of due
process, instead of proscribing applications of law where "no evidence" of
an element of the crime had been introduced. This suggested modification
in the doctrine would not have changed the result in any of the "no evidence"
cases -for example in the present case "sitting" logically is not "strolling"
as required by the statute. This change, however, would have shifted the
emphasis from the quantum of evidence present, 22 which provoked the dissenting justices to strain to find "some" evidence. The dissent states, "Most
23
inhabitants of park benches reach their bench by wandering or strolling,"
despite the fact that there was nothing in the record to show how defendant
had reached the bench.24 By focusing on the logicality or reasonableness of
the characterization of the evidence, the Court would have avoided an objectionable review of state findings of fact and would have instead disclosed its
underlying choice not to strike down the often-useful vagrancy statute as
overly vague but instead holding only this particular application of the law
invalid as being unreasonable.25
It is apparent from an analysis of the decisions in which the "no evidence"
doctrine has been applied 26 that the rule has generally been used for two
purposes: (I) to avoid a sweeping holding that would invalidate a statute
the Court is presently unwilling to invalidate for vagueness or, more broadly,
to avoid precluding an area from statutory treatment as an area constitutionally protected from any legislation under the first amendment, and (2)
to dramatize abusive police practices or the lack of availability of appeal. The
factual context present in nearly all of the cases shows remarkable similarity
and reveals a distinctly purposive use of the doctrine for these two aims.

22. The dissent stated that "constitutionally sufficient amounts of evidence were presented." 88 S. Ct. at 1715 (1968).
23. Both the Florida supreme court's opinion and Justice Ervin's dissent found that
defendant had "wandered." Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852, 853, 855 (Fla. 1967). In reversing, the United States Supreme Court did not use the grounds suggested by Justice
Ervin's dissent, which maintained that failure to account for one's self is not equivalent
to "no lawful purpose." Id. at 855. On that point, the Court majority held that the fact
that defendant was violating a 10 pan. curfew for being on probation for breaking and
entering established the necessary lack of lawful purpose. 88 S.Ct. at 1714 (1968).
24. Johnson v. Florida, 88 S.Ct. 1713 (1968).
25. A clearer case where this principle of logicality would have freed the Court from
having to accept a dearly illogical finding of fact was Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963), where, in spite of the Court's statement that there was "no evidence at all
of any threatening remarks, hostile gestures, or offensive language on the part of any
member of the crowd," id. at 231, it accepted the South Carolina supreme court's determination that defendants' conduct was a breach of the peace. Id. at 235. It then went on
to hold the statute unconstitutional as infringing on defendants' first amendment freedoms.
26. Cases cited in notes 4,5, 6, 7. 12 supra.
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Usually the defendant is a Negro 27 charged with a minor crime (vagrancy,
loitering, breach of the peace, contempt, or disorderly conduct) ,28 and given
a minor sentence (here probation) by a state court of a Southern state on
uncontested evidence with a judge sitting as sole trier of fact. Usually also,
there are overtones of possible police harassment,2 9 violation of equal
protection, infringement on first amendment freedoms, challenges that the
law is void for vagueness (as in the present case), or claims that the statute
gives inadequate notice of an offense not in herently illegal.
Because of its use chiefly in cases involving Negro demonstrators or
harassment of individual Negroes by police, the doctrine seems to have been
abandoned, as noted earlier, when the Court majority shifted in Adderley v.
Florida30 and began restricting civil rights demonstrations. Until the appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall, the Adderley majority prevented use of the
doctrine. Indeed, the present case is a 5-4 decision, with the remaining four
justices from the Adderley majority in the minority here. Consequently, the
case may be a harbinger of further willingness by the present Court to be
27. Johnson, defendant in the instant case, is Caucasian. Letter to William Knight
Zewadski from Office of Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, October 1,
1968. In all other cases involving the "no evidence" doctrine, except Fields v. City of Fairfield, 375 U.S. 248 (1963), defendants have been Negroes.
28. Major crimes generally do not come before the Court on a no evidence claim because
they usually are not subject to abusive application since counsel is more frequently present
and because there is either a finding of not guilty or a successful motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
29. Significantly, the Court did not question the constitutionality of Florida's vagrancy
statute, which is a useful police tool to prevent crime, despite its general wording and often
archaic categories. The Court here directed its objections more to the failure to meet the
literal requirements of the statute than to police abuse of it. Perhaps this approach resulted
from facts in the record, which may have revealed reasonable grounds for police suspicion.
Notice was taken, although it was minimized, of the fact that several businesses were located
near the bench on which defendant sat in the dark, that Johnson had been convicted of
breaking and entering, and that at the time of arrest he was violating his probation. Two
other facts were ignored by the Court's summary of the record: Johnson was accompanied by
a "male companion" and that he could not remember the last name of the girl he assertedly
had been out with earlier. Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla. 1967). In spite of the
Court's failure to reach the void of vagueness attack on the Florida statute, the fact that it
granted certiorari to an attack on the Florida vagrancy statute may constitute a muted warning to state legislatures, police, and state courts that such statutes and ordinances may successfully be attacked in the future as being void for vagueness. The Florida supreme court, in
accepting the case on remand from the United States Supreme Court, ignored this implicit
warning and humorously tried to justify the absence of the statutory evidence in the record.
It stated: "The officers did not testify the accused wandered or strolled and did not query
as to how he had reached his seat in the dark. Perhaps pedestrian in occult abstrusities they
just assumed he had not been wafted there by teleportation or telekinesis." Johnson v.
Florida, No. 35,705 (Fla. S. Ct., filed Nov. 20, 1968). In response to the Florida court's
reluctant acceptance of the United States Supreme Court's decision, at least one state newspaper urged revision of the vagrancy statute to eliminate its vague and archaic terminology.
Editorial, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 22, 1968, at 18-A, col. 1.
30. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See, e.g., Kipperman, Civil Rights at Armageddon-The
Supreme Court Steps Back: Adderley v. Florida, 3 L. IN TRANSITION Q. 219 (1966); Note,
Constitutional Law, The Right of Peaceful Protest - Adderley v. Florida, 55 CAI. L. RLv.
549 (1967).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss2/11

6

Zewadski: Constitutional Law: The "No Evidence" Doctrine Revived--New Direc
1968]

CASE COMMENTS

283

more lenient to civil rights demonstrators and more restrictive in its readings
of often-vague vagrancy statutes and, barring replacement of the present
majority by more conservative justices, the instant case marks the revitalization
of the "no evidence" doctrine seemingly buried thirty-one months before.
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